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Abstract— Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has numerous
applications in the real world thanks to its outstanding ability
in quickly adapting to the surrounding environments. Despite
its great advantages, DRL is susceptible to adversarial attacks,
which precludes its use in real-life critical systems and applica-
tions (e.g., smart grids, traffic controls, and autonomous vehicles)
unless its vulnerabilities are addressed and mitigated. Thus, this
paper provides a comprehensive survey that discusses emerging
attacks in DRL-based systems and the potential countermeasures
to defend against these attacks. We first cover some fundamen-
tal backgrounds about DRL and present emerging adversarial
attacks on machine learning techniques. We then investigate
more details of the vulnerabilities that the adversary can exploit
to attack DRL along with the state-of-the-art countermeasures
to prevent such attacks. Finally, we highlight open issues and
research challenges for developing solutions to deal with attacks
for DRL-based intelligent systems.
Index Terms—Machine learning, cybersecurity, deep rein-
forcement learning, adversarial machine learning, adversarial
perturbation, and robust machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
The holy grail of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine
Learning (ML) is to develop a autonomous agents that can
interact and learn from the surrounding environment to achieve
their optimal policies. This long-standing challenge for devel-
oping intelligent agents is no longer a pipe dream thanks to
rapid growth in computational AI and ML technologies. In
the last decade, ML especially Deep Learning (DL) has rev-
olutionized fields like computer vision, language processing,
etc. ML is divided into three categories namely, supervised,
unsupervised, and reinforcement learning [1]. In supervised
learning, training data along with the corresponding labels
are available for decision making. Due to very high accuracy
prediction, supervised learning is by far the most well-studied
branch of ML, which has a lot of applications in practice
such as object recognition, speech recognition, spam detection,
pattern recognition and many more. For unsupervised learning,
the decision making is independent of any supervisor which
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precisely means that the learning is performed without know-
ing the true labels of the input data. Reinforcement learning
(RL) is defined as a learning process which tries to find
the best actions for agents to perform at states based on
information they observe while interacting with surrounding
environment. Unlike supervised and unsupervised learning
processes which need data in advance before learning pro-
cesses, RL agents can learn in an online manner, based on
observations obtained through real-time interactions with the
environment.
Since RL is a stochastic trial and error process, it is used
to solve many difficult sequential decision-making problems
in robotics, controls, and many other real-world problems
but RL algorithms have some limitations to implement in
practice mainly due to a long-time interaction learning process.
In particular, it usually takes a lot of time (from a few
hours to a few weeks) for RL algorithms to be converged.
Recently, a new technique combining the advancement of DL
to ameliorate the limitations of RL, called deep reinforcement
learning (DRL) has been introduced [2]. DRL has caught the
imagination of the research community and was listed as one
of ten breakthrough technologies in 2017 by MIT Technology
Review.
DRL has shown great results in many complex decision
making processes such as designated task completion in
robotics [3], navigating driver-less autonomous vehicles [4],
[5], healthcare [6], financial trading [7], smart grids manage-
ment [8], automated transportation management [9], wireless
and data networks management [10], and for playing video
games such as Pong [2], Go [11], etc. In 2017, DRL beat the
human champions in the game of Go [12] and most recently
a team of five DRL agents has beaten the world champion
human team in Dota2 matches1. This shows that DRL is a
breakthrough technology which allows to address very high-
complex and time-sensitive decision making problems in real-
time.
With the rapid adoption of the DRL in critical real-world
applications, the security of DRL has become a very impor-
1https://openai.com/five/
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tant area of research. Recently DRL is found vulnerable to
adversarial attacks, where an imperceptible perturbation is
added to the input to the DRL schemes with a pre-defined
goal of causing a malfunction in the DRL learning process
[13]. This makes it necessary to understand the types and
nature of these adversarial vulnerabilities and their potential
mitigation procedures before deploying the DRL-based real-
life critical systems (e.g. smart grids, autonomous vehicles,
etc.). Here we want to note that the security of supervised and
unsupervised ML is well studied in the literature [14] but the
security of the DRL has not yet received similar attention. In
2018, Behzadan et al. [15] reviewed the security vulnerabilities
and open challenges in DRL, although it provides a good initial
review of the security concerns but it does not properly cover
the security issues associated with four major components of
DRL pipeline (environment, observation, policy, and reward)
and related robustness mechanisms. We aim to fulfill this
requirement by providing a comprehensive survey on attack
and defense techniques together with a discussion of the future
research directions on DRL.
Contributions of this paper: In this paper, we build upon
the existing literature available on security vulnerabilities of
DRL and their countermeasure and provide a comprehensive
review of that literature. Following are the major contributions
of this paper.
• We provide the fundamental knowledge about DRL along
with a non-exhaustive taxonomy of advanced DRL algo-
rithms.
• We then present a comprehensive survey of adversarial
attacks on DRL and their potential countermeasures.
• We also provide the available benchmarks and metrics
for the robustness of DRL.
• Finally, we discuss the open issues and research chal-
lenges in the robustness of DRL and potential research
directions.
Organization of the Paper: The organization of this paper is
depicted in Figure 1. A detailed overview of prominent DRL
schemes, along with the various challenges associated with
them, is presented in Section II. Section III presents a compre-
hensive review of adversarial ML attacks on the DRL pipeline.
A detailed overview of defenses proposed in the literature to
ensure robustness against adversarial attacks is presented in
Section IV. Section V presents the available benchmarking
tools and metrics along with open research problems in DRL.
Section VI describes the open issues and research challenges
in designing adversarial attacks and robustness mechanisms for
DRL. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII. For the
convenience of the reader, a summary of the salient acronyms
used in this paper is presented in Table I.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first provide a brief description of
the Markov decision process (MDP). Then, we discuss the
fundamental definitions involved in the DRL process. Finally,
we provide a summary of DRL techniques and their potential
shortcomings.
A generic RL problem is described as an MDP, described
by state, action, reward, and dynamics of the system. In an
MDP, at each decision time epoch, e.g., a time step, the agent
3TABLE I: List of Acronyms.
AI Artificial Intelligence
ATN Adversarial Transformation Networks
A3C Asynchronous Advantage Actor-Critic
A2C Advantage Actor-Critic
DRL Deep Reinforcement Learning
DDPG Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient
DDQNs Double Deep Q-Networks
DQN Deep Q-Networks
DRQN Deep Recurrent Q-Network
FGSM Fast Gradient Sign Method
GPS Graded Policy Search
IRL Inverse Reinforcement Learning
MDP Markov Decision Process
NAF Normalized Advantage Function
POMDP Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
RBFQ Radial Basis Function based Q-learning
SARSA State-Action-Reward-State-Action Algorithm
SDN Software Defined Networking
SGD Stochastic Gradient Descent
TMDPs Threatened Markov Decision Processes
TRPO Trust Region Policy Optimization
Fig. 2: Basic setting of RL.
observes the current state st and performs an action at based
on its current optimal policy pi∗. After the action is executed,
the agent observes its reward rt and next state st+1 obtained
at the end of the time step. The aim of MDP is to find the best
actions which maximize its long-term average reward. Fig. 2
illustrates a typical MDP with an agent interacting with its
surrounding environment.
The important concepts used in DRL are described as
follows:
• Environment is a simulator or a real-world scenario in
which the agent interacts and learns. At each time step,
the agent interacts with the environment governed by the
policy and in return gets a reward which determines the
quality of the action. Environment is divided into two
categories namely fully observable, and partially observ-
able. In a fully observable environment, the agent can
observe all information of the environment. For partially
observable environment, the agent can only observe some
information of the environment.
• Policy defines how the agent will behave in the envi-
ronment at a particular time. In other words, it is a
mapping from the perceived states of the environment to
the actions taken in those conditions. Policies are further
divided into two types: namely deterministic policy and
stochastic policy. When actions taken by the agent are
deterministic, the policy is termed as deterministic. On
the other hand, when the actions are sampled from a
probability distribution function of environment states,
the policy is called to be stochastic.
• On-policy algorithms enable an agent to learn and
update its policy in an online manner through real-
time interaction with the environment. Samples generated
from a pre-known target policy can be used to train the
algorithm to estimate the policy in advance.
• Off-policy algorithms use an online policy and a target
policy. The target policy is used to estimate the action
values while the online policy is being learned. After a
certain interval of time, the target policy is updated with
the online policy. Hence, the agent can estimate the target
policy without its complete knowledge.
• Action is a stimulus used by the agent for interaction
with the environment. The actions can be discrete and
continuous based on the environment and DRL problem
formulation.
• Reward is an incentive, usually expressed by a numerical
value, the agent receives after making an action. The goal
of an agent is to maximize the accumulative reward.
• Model mimics the behavior of the environment, hence
allowing inferences to be made about the behavior of
the environment. Based on the availability of models, the
DRL schemes can be divided into two categories namely
model-based and model-free RL.
• Value function specifies the value of a state. Value is
defined as the maximum expected accumulative reward
an agent may get from a specific state. Mathematically,
it is determined as in equation (1).
V pi(s) =
T∑
t′=t
r((st′ , at′)|st). (1)
.
• Q-function specifies the Q-value of a state. Q-value is
defined as the maximum expected accumulative reward
an agent may get by taking a specific action at a specific
state. Mathematically, it can be calculated as follows:
Qpi(s, a) =
T∑
t′=t+1
r((st′ , at′)|(st, at)). (2)
.
• Exploration and exploitation: Exploration is the process
when the agent tries to explore the surrounding envi-
ronment by taking different actions available at a given
state. Exploitation occurs after exploration. The agent
exploits the optimal actions to get the best accumulated
reward. An -greedy policy is used to balance between
exploration and exploitation. The agent chooses a random
action with a certain probability otherwise it takes the
action proposed by the policy.
The DRL can be divided into two major categories namely
model-free and model-based RL algorithms 2. These categories
2https://spinningup.openai.com/en/latest/spinningup/rl.html
4Fig. 3: A non-exhaustive taxonomy of major DRL schemes.
are based on whether a model is not being used or being
used while learning, respectively. Model-free RL methods can
learn directly from real-time interactions with the environment,
while model-based RL methods can learn offline by using
simulated model, resulting in an increased sample efficiency.
A. Model-free RL
In model-free RL, the focus is on calculating the value
function directly from the interactions with the environment.
Model-free RL is further divided into two parts namely Q-
learning and policy optimization.
1) Q-learning: Q-Learning was proposed by Watkins et al.
[16] where the concept of learning the Q-values Q(st, at) has
been shown to be useful in solving the dynamic learning prob-
lems. The main aim of the Q-learning algorithm is to maximize
the Q-value function iteratively following the equation (3),
where st+1 is the new state in the MDP based on the action
taken in previous state st and at+1 is a possible action in st+1.
α expresses the learning rate and i shows the iteration.
Qi+1(st, at) = Qi(st, at) + α(Ri+1+
γmax at+1(Qi(st+1, at+1))−Qi(st, at)),
(3)
Q-learning determines the optimal policy by using the
Bellman equation given in equation (4).
Qt(st, at) = E[R(st, at) + γmax
at+1
(Q(st+1, at+1))]. (4)
Although the Q-learning algorithm has been demonstrated
to be able to achieve good performance in solving sequential
decision-making problems, it has following limitations:
• A slight change in the Q values will introduce chaotic
behavior in the policy estimation, which is not desirable.
• If the action space is in real numbers, the state-space
can grow to be infinitely large, and thus processing such
infinitely large state-space is intractable.
• The Q-learning training process provided in equations (3)
and (4) takes consecutive samples to learn, and usually
successive samples are correlated, which violates the
independent and identically distributed assumption of the
training process.
To overcome these issues, Google DeepMind3 demonstrate
that an RL algorithm based on DNN [2] can handle large
state-space and can perform human-level tasks such as playing
Atari games. The proposed architecture is termed as DQN.
DQN is an off-policy algorithm and it uses the principle of
exploration during learning. The main purpose of the DQN is
to learn the spatio-temporal features of the high dimensional
input. The strength of the DQN lies in the ability to both
approximating the Q-functions and representing the high-
dimensional observations. Mnih et al. [2] noted that RL is
known to be unstable, and the method of using nonlinear
function approximators for representing the action values is
bound to diverge. This will result in small updates in Q-values
significantly changing the policy. Mnih et al. propose using
experience replay and target network to stabilize the learning
process.
Experience replay is defined as a procedure of storing
previous experiences of the agent in the memory. This allows
the DRL algorithm to be able to sample random batches
from the memory and learn from previously observed data
offline. The older samples are discarded as time progresses.
Experience replay greatly reduces the variance and the num-
ber of interactions required by the agent to learn from the
environment. The target network process is another DNN
that is presented along with the actual online DNN used in
DQN for representing the online policy. The weights of this
network are updated with the weights of the online network
on specific intervals while those of the online one are updated
at each iteration. The estimates of Q-values that are being
learned by the online network are fluctuating rapidly. These
two methods introduced in DQN can help achieve a better
policy than the previous simple Q-learning. Nair et al. [17]
introduce a distributed DQN and develope a framework for
training multiple DQN in parallel. They show an increase in
performance and a reduction in the training time.
Van et al. [18] show that the DQN may overestimate the
Q-values and propose a new method called double deep Q-
learning (DDQN). In [18], it is proved that the estimator
used in DQN overestimates the expected return because the
3https://deepmind.com/
5maximum action value is used as an approximation of the
expected value. In DDQN, the action selection is proposed
by an online network, but its value estimation for the update
is done by using a target network. By using online and
target networks, a better estimate of the policy can be learned
to achieve greater performance. Wang et al. [19] propose a
dueling architecture that ensures the generalization in learning
across actions without affecting the underlying DRL process.
The motivation behind separating the state values and state-
dependent action advantages via two separate streams is to
show that it is unnecessary to know the value of each action at
every time-step unless a valuable state is in danger of suffering
a loss.
Hausknecht et al. [20] propose Deep Recurrent Q-Network
(DRQN), in which a combination of Q-functions with re-
current neural networks (RNN) is used for learning the Q-
values. Since RNN are used for learning, they will provide a
better learning opportunity in the case of partially observable
environments by integrating information over long periods.
So, the algorithm will be able to reach the optimal sequences
where the optimal states lie far from each other in terms of
time. DRQN can achieve better performance in the game of
“pong” where a deep recurrence produces a better policy [20].
Deep attention recurrent Q-networks (DARQN) [21] is the
combination of DRQN with an attention learning scheme. This
makes the DNN aware of the position (where to focus), hence
making it capable of long-term planning. It outperforms both
DQNs and DRQNs due to this capability. The uses of DRQNs
and DARQNs are not limited to learning value-functions. They
can be applied to policy search and actor-critic methods. For-
tunato et al. [22] propose noisy DQN where a functional noise
is added to the DNN policy instead of state-space which in
turn forces the agent to learn better parameters for DQN. This
noisy exploration process provides a superhuman performance
on Atari games [22] at the cost of a smaller computational
overhead. Hessel et al. [23] propose Rainbow DQN where
they combine all independent improvement made in DQN
procedure and show the contribution of each independent
improvement in the overall DQN learning procedure.
2) Policy optimization: Policy optimization is the process
of directly searching for an optimal policy by using gradient-
based or gradient-less schemes. Gradient-free methods are
especially useful in cases of low-dimensional problems, while
for high-dimensional problems, policy-gradient methods are
the best method for dealing with high-dimensionality and sam-
ple efficiency. The policy pi(a|s; θ) is a probability distribution
pi over action a when observing state s, where θ is a neural
network that parameterizes the policy pi. The policy gradient
theorem, provided in equation (5), is defined as the derivative
of the projected reward which is defined as the expected value
of the product of the reward and gradient of the log of the
policy [24].
∇Epiθ [rt] = Epiθrt∇ log piθ(t), (5)
where piθ is given as:
piθ(t) = P (s0)
T∏
t=1
piθ(at|st)p(st+1, rt+1|st, at). (6)
Although policy gradient methods represent the most pop-
ular continuous-action DRL algorithm, these methods have
some limitations such as high variance, noisy gradients, batch
sizes, and non-applicability (in case of non-differentiable poli-
cies). Optimization becomes difficult when the state-space of
the RL problem is large or continuous. Policy gradient and
actor-critic methods can be used to mitigate this problem by
looking for a local optimum. Silver et al. [25] introduce and
demonstrate an off-policy actor-critic algorithm that can vastly
improve upon a stochastic policy gradient (SPG) for the case
of continuous spaces. DPG, when combined with DL, gives
rise to DDPG [26]. Although DDPG works fine in the real-
world continuous time problems, it requires a lot of training
to search for a good enough policy.
In DRL, we want to keep as close to the original model as
possible and try not to reach a local cost minimum. Levine et
al. [27] propose a solution to this problem by using supervised
learning in combination with importance sampling to learn
the optimal policy. This technique helps the agent reach the
optimal maximum reward. The policy-search is model-free
but is guided by a model-based algorithm. This technique is
shown to be successful in simulated environments [28], [29].
A similar approach called asynchronous advantage actor-critic
(A3C) algorithm where multiple local policies are used to
learn an optimal global policy [30]. Formally, A3C combines
advantage updates with the actor-critic formulation to learn the
optimal global policy. The policy is updated asynchronously
by the multiple CPUs presented on a single machine or dis-
tributed across the cluster. The use of the multiple independent
agents not only stabilizes the network, but also improves the
exploration. It is applied in a real-world robotics application by
Zhu et al. [31] while using high-dimensional visual inputs. On
the other hand, the Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) algorithm
[30] uses a single-threaded learner to sample from separate
environment instances and collects all data into one mini-batch
to compute the gradient.
While learning the policy, dynamic state-distribution causes
a serious problem as change in the state distribution will cause
an oscillation in policy learning. Therefore, the policy updates
are needed to be more carefully crafted. An advantage function
is used for the policy updates. As long as the advantages
are positive, the policy will always be in a better direction.
Fitting these advantage functions is based on the gradient
update step of RL process and determining an appropriate
size of the gradient step is very challenging. For this exact
purpose, trust regions policy optimization (TRPO) was pro-
posed by Schulman et al. [32]. The difference between the
new and the current policy is found using Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence. This restricts the optimization steps to lie
in a trusted region and hence prevents the new policies from
diverging too far in the case of a bad update. The TRPO is
shown to be relatively more robust and more applicable in
6the real environments where the agent has to deal with very
high-dimensional input. By combining the TRPO with model-
learning, better results can be achieved where the model is
trained in a simulated environment and deployed in a real
dynamic environment. Later Schulman et al. [33] propose
proximal policy optimization (PPO) as an update to TRPO.
[33] perform unconstrained optimization, requiring only the
information of the first-order gradient. The major features
of PPO are the improvement of sample complexity, ease of
implementation, and low sensitivity to parameter tuning. It
updates the parameters using mini-batches from each set of
samples. The PPO is able to retain the performance of TRPO
with low complexity. More details on model-free schemes can
be found in [34].
B. Model-Based RL
In model-based DRL the optimal learning trajectory is de-
fined using the model of the environment. Model-based RL is a
very less explored area of research. The model-based RL tech-
niques can be divided into two types, one in which the model
is already given and the other in which the model is needed
to be learned. Training these model-based DRL algorithms
requires a large number of samples than those of the normal
model-based RL algorithms. Racaniere et al. [35] introduce
imagination augmented agents (I2A) as both a model-based
and model-free technique. The major difference between I2A
and other model-based techniques is that it does not use the
model to arrive at policy but uses the predictions from the
model to construct an implicit plan. It shows to have improved
robustness to model misspecifications and outperforms the
baseline model-free algorithms in games like Pacman and
Sokoban. These results enlighten the future prospects of
model-based RL. Nagabandi et al. [36] introduce model-based
priors for model-free reinforcement learning (MBMF) where
sample complexity of model-based DRL scheme is improved
by using another medium-sized network with model predictive
control (MPC). MBMF is tested on multiple MuJoCo (Multi-
Joint dynamics with Contact) environments including hopper,
swimmer, cheetah, and ant agents. MBMF shows a sample
efficiency (the efficiency in terms of requiring less samples for
training) of 3-5 times than the model-free algorithms. Due to
the sample efficiency, the learning is fast as compared to those
of model-free algorithms. Feinberg et al. [37] introduce model-
based value expansion (MVE) as a solution to deal with the
uncertainty caused by imagining data to speed up the learning
process.
Buckman et al. [38] introduce stochastic ensemble value
expansion (STEVE) as a technique to combine model-free
algorithms with model-based algorithms while saving from a
fall in performance due to errors in the model. The algorithm
chooses dynamically between the model-free and model-based
approach and uses the defined model only if switching between
model-based and model-free starts introducing errors in the
learning. STEVE outperforms the model-free baselines in
continuous control tasks while achieving a superior sam-
ple efficiency in robo-school-humanoid-v1 and robo-school-
humanoid-flagrun-v1 gaming environments. Kurutuch et al.
[39] model ensemble trust region policy optimization (ME-
TRPO) as a sample-efficient solution to maintain the model-
uncertainty and regularize the learning process in cases of
insufficient data available for training. The performance of the
algorithm is reported on games like cheetah, swimmer, hopper,
snake, ant, and Humanoid. It shows a noticeable improvement
over the previously proposed state-of-the-art algorithms in
terms of sample efficiency. Thus, there are techniques in which
the model does not need to be learned as it is already given
like the famous AlphaZero [12] and Exlt [40]. Further details
on model-based RL can be found in [34].
C. Security of ML
Although the utilization of ML techniques has revolution-
ized many areas like vision, language, speech, and control;
it has also introduced new security challenges that are very
threatening in designing and developing new dynamic intelli-
gent systems. Security attacks in ML can be divided into two
categories namely training phase attacks and inference phase
attacks. For training phase attacks, also known as poisoning
attacks, the adversary tries to force the learning process to
learn faulty model/policy by introducing small imperceptible
perturbations to the input data. Inference phase attacks, also
known as evasion attacks, are performed by the adversary
at the inference/test time of the ML pipeline to fool the
model/policy in providing malfunctioned results/actions.
The imperceptible perturbation used for crafting malicious
input for the ML model is known as a adversarial perturba-
tion, whereas the malicious input used for performing evasion
attack on ML pipeline is known as an adversarial example.
Adversarial examples are classified into three major categories
based on the objective, knowledge, and specificity. Formally,
an adversarial example x∗ is created by adding a small
imperceptible carefully crafted perturbation δ to the correctly
classified example x. The perturbation δ is calculated by
approximating the optimization problem given in equation (7)
iteratively until the crafted adversarial example gets classified
by ML classifier f(.) in targeted class t. Figure 4 shows a
basic taxonomy of attacks on ML.
x∗ = x+ argmin
δx
‖δ‖ : f(x+ δ) = t. (7)
1) Attacks based on adversary’s knowledge: Depending
on the adversary’s knowledge about the targeted ML model,
adversarial attacks are divided into further three categories
namely white-box attacks, gray-box attacks, and black-box
attacks. In the case of white-box attacks, the adversary has
the perfect knowledge of the target ML/DL algorithm, i.e.,
the adversary knows the training and testing data, parameters
of the model, etc. These attacks are used for the worst-case
security malfunction analysis of an ML/DL system. In the
case of gray-box attacks, the adversary is supposed to have
limited knowledge (knowledge about feature representation
and optimization algorithms only) about the targeted ML/DL
model. Adversary designs a surrogate model on the limited
7Fig. 4: Taxonomy of adversarial attacks classified according to the adversarys objective, knowledge, specificity, and attack frequency.
knowledge available and uses transferability property [41]
of the adversarial examples (where an adversarial example
evading a classifier will evade other similar classifiers even
if they are trained in other dataset) to evade the ML/DL based
system. The attacker may also have limited test access to the
model, i.e., he may be able to ask the model the output on
some inputs. In the case of black-box attacks, the adversary
does not know the model or any of its attributes. The adversary
can only query the systems for labels or confidence score
and develop an adversarial perturbation based on the feedback
provided by the deployed ML/DL model.
2) Attacks based on adversary’s goals: Based on the adver-
sary’s objective, adversarial attacks are divided in four types:
1) confidence reduction attacks in which adversarial attacks
are launched to compromise the accuracy of the de-
ployed ML/DL based system;
2) misclassification attacks in which adversarial attacks are
launched for disturbing the classification boundary of
any class to cause misclassification;
3) targeted misclassification attacks in which adversarial
attacks are launched to misclassify only a targeted class;
4) source/target misclassification attacks in which adver-
sarial attacks are launched to force misclassification of
a specific source class into a specifically targeted class.
3) Attacks based on adversary’s specificity: Based on
specificity, adversarial examples can be classified into two
types, i.e., targeted and non-targeted. These concepts are
similar to the ones as in the case of the adversary’s objective.
In the case of targeted attacks, the attackers target specific
classes in the output, while in the case of non-targeted attacks,
the goal is to misclassify the maximum number of samples.
4) Adversarial transferability: In 2016, Papernot et al. [42]
showed the adversarial examples to be transferable among
different models, implying that adversarial examples gener-
ated for one ML model will work as an adversarial sample
for other ML models trained for a similar task with high
probability. The authors divide transferability into two types:
(1) cross-model/cross-technique transferability in which the
same adversarial sample is being misclassified by different ML
algorithms; and (2) cross-training-set/intra-technique transfer-
ability in which the same adversarial sample being misclas-
sified by models trained on subsets of the same training set.
This property of transferability greatly reduces the minimum
knowledge that adversaries must possess of a machine learning
classifier to force it to misclassify inputs that they crafted.
Hence, an adversary can train his model (not knowing the
target model), to generate adversarial samples, and use them
to evade the target model.
D. Security of DRL
The increasing use of DRL in practical applications has led
to an investigation of the security risks it faces. However, the
security challenges faced by DRL are different from those
experienced by other ML algorithms. The major difference is
that a DRL process is trained to solve sequential decision-
making problems in contrast to most other ML schemes
that are trained to solve single-step prediction problems.
The interdependence of the current actions on the previous
ones increases the degrees-of-freedom of adversarial attacks
raising new challenges that must be addressed. This makes
the adversarial attacks more challenging to be recognized, as
we cannot discriminate between the action intentionally taken
by the agent and the action the adversary forces/lures the agent
to take. Also, the training is done on a dataset from a fixed
distribution in the case of ML, in contrast to the DRL where
the agent begins with a deterministic or stochastic policy and
starts exploring for best actions.
Usually, RL problems are formulated as an MDP consisting
of four parts (s,a,r,p). Hence, an adversary has more choices
to attack. If the adversary targets the state space, imperceptible
perturbations can be added to the environment directly by
perturbing the sensors [43]. Similarly, an adversary can target
any of the four major components of MDP. Adversarial attacks
on DRL are classified into inference-time and training-time
8Fig. 5: Taxonomy of adversarial attacks on DRL based on the adversary’s target.
attacks. An adversary may compromise one or more than one
dimension of confidentiality, integrity, and availability [15].
Based on the goal of the adversary, the adversarial attacks
on DRL can be classified into active or passive. For active
attacks, then the adversary desires to change the behavior
of the agent, while for passive attacks, the adversary desires
to infer details about the model, reward function, or other
parts of DRL. An adversary can use these details to either
create a copy of the model or use them to perform an attack
on the model. The adversary may be limited by the part
of the environment, where an adversary is only capable of
making changes to a certain area of the environment. Adding
a lot of perturbation in a single time instance is not desirable
as it makes the attack perceptible which is not desired by
the adversary. Distinguishing the adversarial samples from
the normal ones in the case of DRL is not as easy as in
supervised learning (in which the problem is simpler due to
the availability of labels).
It is important to note here that the problem of secure RL
is different from the problem of safe RL [44], [45]. The goal
of safe RL is to learn policies to minimize the expectation
of reward. In contrast, the goal of secure RL is to make the
learning process robust and resilient to adversarial attacks. For
example, in the case of a robot given a task to navigate through
a maze, the goal is to reach the specified destination. This
robot can be attacked by an adversary and mislead to reach
a destination specified by the adversary which is different
from the target one. The goal of secure RL is to make the
DRL model robust and resilient to such adversarial attacks.
Though safe RL and secure RL overlap, different approaches
are employed for each of these.
III. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON DRL
In this section, we discuss the adversarial attacks on DRL.
We divide the attacks on DRL into four categories based on
the functional components of the DRL process. Table II shows
Fig. 6: Depiction of adversarial attacks on reward. Bold shows the part being perturbed
directly. Italic shows the parts that are indirectly affected by the attack. Bold+Italic
shows the outcome of the attack.
a summary of the adversarial attacks on DRL. Figure 8 shows
a basic taxonomy of adversarial attacks on DRL based on the
adversary’s target.
A. Attacks Targeting the Reward
An adversary may choose to either perturb the reward
directly or even perturb it indirectly by altering the parts of
the MDP it has access to. Figure 6 shows a basic depiction of
governing an adversarial attack on the DRL agent’s reward.
1) Attacks directly perturbing the reward: In 2018, Han et
al. [46] discuss the reaction of the DRL agent in software-
defined networking to different adversarial attacks. The DRL
techniques introduced by Han et al. [46] are DDQN and A3C.
The adversary adopts white-box and black-box settings for
both inference and poisoning attacks in an online setting.
They propose two kinds of attacks: flipping reward signals and
manipulating states. For flipping reward signals, the adversary
can manipulate the reward signal of the model by flipping it for
a certain number of times. For state manipulation, the attacker
makes two changes in the first few steps of the training, i.e., an
9adversary can add one false positive and one false negative in
the states. Hence, the adversary is able to change the label of
one compromised node to be uncompromised and vice versa.
Huang et al. [47] discuss the effect of malicious falsification
of the reward signal on the agent leading it into taking targeted
decisions. They characterize a robust region for policy in
which the adversary can never achieve the desired policy while
keeping the cost in this region. They use four terms to specify
different types of attackers: namely (1) omniscient attacker
who has all the information before a certain time t; (2) peer
attacker who does not know about the transition probabilities
but has access to the knowledge the agent has before a time t;
(3) ignorant attacker who only knows the cost signals before a
time t; and (4) blind attacker that has no information at time t.
All these attackers may be limited by the budget of the attack
and other constraints. It is shown that by the falsification of
the cost at each state, all of these adversaries can mislead the
agent into learning a policy desired by the adversary.
2) Adversarial attack on reward signals by perturbing the
states: Pattanaik et al. [48] propose three types of gradient-
based adversarial attacks on DQN and DDPG techniques for
reducing the expected reward by adding perturbations to the
observations. They argue that the previous attacks on DRL
based on FGSM [49] are not using an optimal cost function
for crafting the adversarial inputs. They also show that the
proposed attacks perform better than simple FGSM attack in
decaying the performance of DRL schemes.
The first attack is based on a naive approach of adding
random noise to the DRL states to mislead the DRL agent in
selecting a sub-optimal action that decays the performance of
the DRL scheme. The second attack is a gradient-based (GB)
attack, where a novel cost function is introduced for creating
adversarial actions, that outperforms the FGSM in finding out
the worst possible discrete action to limit the performance of
DRL schemes. The third attack is an improved version of
the second attack. Instead of using a simple gradient-based
approach for generating adversarial perturbation, the authors
use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) for adversarial action
generation which ultimately misleads the DRL agent to end
up in a pre-defined adversarial state. The authors validate these
attacks by testing them on DDQN and RBFG agents which
were trained in the cart pole and mountain car environments.
The authors also compare the results of their proposed attacks
and show that their gradient-based attack works better in
deteriorating the performance of both types of agents.
3) Adversarial attacks on reward signals by perturbing the
action space: Yeow et al. [50] propose two attacks on the
action space of the DRL algorithms. The first one is an opti-
mization problem for minimizing the cumulative reward of the
DRL agent with decoupled constraints called myopic action
space (MAS) attack. The second one has the same objective
as the first one but with temporally coupled constraints called
look-ahead Action Space (LAS) attack. The results show that
LAS is more lethal in deteriorating the performance of the
DRL algorithm as it can attack the dynamic information of the
agent. This attack is also shown to perform well in the case
Fig. 7: Depiction of adversarial attacks on policy. Bold shows the part being perturbed
directly. Italic shows the parts that are indirectly affected by the attack. Bold+Italic
shows the outcome of the attack.
of limited resources. Such attacks can be used to gain insights
into the potential vulnerabilities of the DRL model. Yeow et
al. [50] also speculate that their proposed attacks on reward
signals by perturbing the action space cannot be defended as
the action space is independent of the policy. However, it can
be detected by having a look at the decay in the reward. They
show their results on PPO [33] trained on the Lunar-Lander
environment and DDQNs trained on both Lunar-Lander and
BiPedal Walker.
B. Attacks Targeting the Policy
The adversary can both directly or indirectly target the
policy of the DRL agent. Figure 7 shows a basic depiction
of governing an adversarial attack on the policy.
1) Adversarial attacks on DRL policy by perturbing the
states: Huang et al. [51] show the effect of adversarial attacks
on neural network policies in DRL. They use the FGSM attack
to introduce perturbations in raw input of the DRL policy
which results in a significant drop in the performance of DQN,
TRPO, and A3C methods in both white and black-box settings.
The same FGSM attack, as suggested in [13], is used for
attacking A3C and TRPO, and it is reported that both schemes
show the same vulnerabilities. The performance of the attack
on A3C and TRPO is also compared with DQN and it is
demonstrated that DQN is more susceptible to adversarial at-
tacks than those of the TRPO and A3C. Huang et al. [51] also
discuss different settings of black-box attacks: one in which
the adversary knows the environment, the training algorithm
and the hyperparameters but not the random initialization;
and the other one in which the adversary does not have any
knowledge of the training model or hyperparameters. A flow
of the attacks carried out by Huang et al. [51] is shown in
Figure 9.
Unlike [51], Lin et al. [52] consider a different approach and
propose two adversarial attack techniques on DRL schemes,
namely, strategically-timed attack and enchanting attacks.
These attacks are based on the argument that previously
discussed FGSM attacks may not be practically feasible and
easy to detect. For strategically-timed attacks, they propose to
minimize the reward of the DRL schemes by using adversarial
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Fig. 8: Four major classes of DRL vulnerabilities based on the adversary’s target.
Fig. 9: Two approaches for generating adversarial examples, applied to a policy trained
using DQN [2] to play Pong as shown in [51]. Top: The adversarial example is computed
using the FGSM with an ∞-norm constraint on the adversarial perturbation. Bottom:
The adversarial example is computed using FGSM with an 1-norm constraint; the optimal
perturbation is to create a fake ball lower than the position of the actual ball.
examples on a subset of time steps in an episode of the
DRL operation. For enchanting attacks Lin et al. [52] propose
a novel method of luring the DRL agent to a predefined
targeted state by using a generative model and a sophisticated
planning algorithm. The generative model is used to predict
the next state in the space and the planning algorithm is used
to generate actions required for luring the agent to the targeted
state. Performance of strategically-timed attack and enchanting
attack are reported on DQN and A3C agents, playing five Atari
games where a 70% of the success rate of the adversarial
attacks is reported. [52] use the Carlini and Wagner (C&W)
attack [53] for generating adversarial inputs. It is also shown
that perturbing only 25% of the inputs using the proposed
method produces the same results as the previously proposed
attacks based on FGSM. A description of the working of the
enchanting attack is given in Figure 10.
Kos et al. [54] test the effects of adversarial examples and
random noise on the DRL policies. They argue that the FGSM-
based adversarial examples perform better than random noise.
They also show that the proposed method uses the value
function to guide the adversarial perturbation injection which
reduces the number of adversarial perturbations needed for
introducing a malfunction in DRL policies. It is further argued
that perturbing all states may not be practically feasible so
three types of attack situations are proposed: (1) the addition
of noise at a fixed frequency; (2) the addition of specially de-
signed perturbed inputs after N samples; (3) the recalculation
of the perturbation after N samples and adding the previously
calculated perturbation to the intermediate steps. The results
show their last approach of recalculating adversarial inputs
performs as good as the one in which all states are perturbed.
The proposed attacks are also tested for re-training with adver-
sarial examples and random noise to show that resilience can
be improved against both FGSM adversarial perturbations and
random noise. The proposed method successfully deteriorates
the performance of the Atari Pong playing agent which uses
A3C scheme.
Tretschk et al. [55] propose a similar approach to the
enchanting attacks proposed by Lin et al. [52] where they
use the adversarial transformer network (ATN) [56] to impose
adversarial reward on the policy network of DRL. The ATN
makes the agent maximize the adversarial reward through a
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Fig. 10: An illustration of enchanting attack on Pacman is depicted which is highlighting all four components: (1) action sequence planning, (2) crafting an adversarial example
with a target-action, (3) the agent takes an action, and (4) environment generates the next state st+1.
sequence of adversarial inputs. Complete information regard-
ing the agent and the target environment is required, hence
making the attach white box. The experiments are performed
on a DQN trained for playing Pong. It is shown that given
a large-enough threshold for perturbation, the agent can be
made to follow the adversarial policy at the test time. Figure 11
shows a basic illustration of the threat model used by Tretschk
et al. [55].
Fig. 11: An overview of ATN process in depicted, where the adversarial examples are
crafted by adding perturbation in the states of DQN.
Kiourti et al. [57] show the vulnerability of DRL models
to Trojan attacks with adversary having access to the training
phase of the model. An adversary may create and hide some
deficiencies in the policy to use them later for his benefit. It is
reported that by only modifying 0.025% of the training data, an
adversary can induce such hidden behaviors in the policy that
the models perform perfectly well until the Trojan is triggered.
The proposed attack is shown to be resistant against current
defense techniques for Trojans. The results of the attacks are
reported on A2C in six different gaming environments: Pong,
Space Invaders, Qbert, Breakout, Seaquest, and Crazy Climber.
Behzadan et al. [58] present a technique for watermarking
DRL policies from saving them from model extraction attacks.
This involves the integration of a unique response to a specific
sequence of states while keeping its impact on performance
minimum, hence saving from the unauthorized replication of
policies. The results are reported on a DQN trained in a
CartPole environment. It is also shown that the unwatermarked
policies are not able to follow the identified trajectory which
is specified during the training. This technique is similar to
the Trojan attacks proposed by Kiourti et al. [57] and can be
used by adversaries to hide specific patterns in the policy and
use them to their benefit later.
2) Model extraction attacks: Behzadan et al. [59] propose
an adversarial attack for targeting the confidentiality of the
DRL policy. The proposed attack performs a model extraction
attack by using imitation learning while querying the original
model iteratively. They show that the adversarial examples
generated for the model extracted are transferred successfully
to the original model hence affecting its performance in a
black-box setting. They use FGSM for generating adversarial
examples for the imitated model. The results of the proposed
attack are reported on DQN, A2C, and PPO [33] trained in a
CartPole environment. It is also shown that by providing the
attack a sufficient number of observations, adversarial exam-
ples can be crafted with high efficiency. They use adversarial
regret, i.e., the difference between maximum return achievable
by the trained policy pi and return achieved from actions of
adversarial policy, as a metric to measure the performance of
their attacks. They show an increase in adversarial regret in
case of adversarial policy.
3) Adversarial attacks on DRL policy by perturbing the
environment: Hussenot et al. [60] propose two types of
adversarial attacks to make a DRL agent to follow a desired
policy. The first one called per-observation attack that includes
the creation of adversarial perturbation for every observation
of the agent and adding that perturbation to the environment.
The second one called constant attack includes the addition
of one universal perturbation, created at the start of the attack,
to all the observations. These attacks are discussed in both the
targeted and non-targeted situations. In the case of the targeted
attack, the constant attack is also termed as universal mask
attack. The results of both the attacks are reported on DQN
and Rainbow DQN trained on four Atari games, namely Pong,
Space Invaders, Air Raid, and HERO. It is also reported that
the proposed attacks are more successful if the FGSM is used
for generating the perturbations in untargeted attack situations,
whereas in the case of targeted attacks the FGSM is not able
to generate imperceptible adversarial samples.
4) Adversarial attacks on DRL policy by involving an
adversarial agent: Gleave et al. [61] propose a novel threat
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Fig. 12: Depiction of adversarial attacks on observation. Bold shows the part being
perturbed directly. Italic shows the parts that are indirectly affected by the attack.
Bold+Italic shows the outcome of the attack.
algorithm in which the adversary is controlling an adversary
agent in the same environment with the legitimate agent. The
adversary is not able to manipulate the observations of the
legitimate agent but can create natural observations that can
act as adversarial inputs and make the agent follow desired
policy. This leads to a zero-sum game between the adversarial
agent and the legitimate agent. The results show that the
adversary can win the game by confusing the legitimate agent.
The adversarial agent is based on PPO and the victim agent
is based on LSTM and MLP. After showing the existence
of such adversarial policies, it is suggested that the model
should be frozen after performing the learning to save it from
learning undesired behaviors. Such adversarial agents can also
be used in making the models better by constantly attacking
and retraining.
C. Attacks Targeting the Observation
As discussed previously that while targeting the observation
(states and sensors of the DRL pipeline), the attacker can
manipulate the sensory data or the sensors directly. Figure
12 shows a basic depiction of adversarial attacks on the
observations of the DRL agent.
1) Attacks perturbing the states: Behzadan et al. [13] show
that the DQN is vulnerable to adversarial attacks and verify the
transferability of adversarial examples across different DQN
models. For this attack, the authors exploit the fact that DNN
is a core part of DQN. Thus, if DNNs are vulnerable to
adversarial perturbations then DQN can also be compromised
by carefully crafting imperceptible adversarial examples. [13]
consider a man-in-the-middle adversary between the environ-
ment and the DRL agent, where the adversary takes the states
from the environment to perturb them and then forwards the
perturbed states to the DRL agent to take the desired action. To
ensure the imperceptibility of the perturbation, the amplitude
of the adversarial examples crafting algorithms (FGSM and
JSMA [62]) is controlled.
The attack procedure is divided into two phases, initial-
ization and exploitation. The initialization phase includes the
training of a DQN on adversarial reward function to generate
an adversarial policy. Then a replica of the target’s DQN
Fig. 13: The process of policy induction attack [13] is performed on the game of pong.
is created and is initialized from random parameters. The
exploitation phase includes generating adversarial inputs such
that the target DQN can be made to follow actions governed
by the adversarial policy. Furthermore, Behzadan et al. [13]
also propose an attack method to manipulate the policy of the
DQN by exploiting the transferability of adversarial samples.
They use a black-box setting and show a success rate of 70%
when adversarial examples are transferred from one model to
another. The cycle of policy induction attack proposed in [13]
is shown in Figure 13.
The research on real-time attacks on robotic systems in a dy-
namic environment has recently been explored. In 2018, Clark
et al. [43] evaluate a white-box adversarial attack on the DRL
policy of an autonomous robot in a dynamic environment. The
goal of the DRL robot is to reach the destination by routing
through the environment, while the goal of the adversary is
to mislead the agent into the wrong routes. The adversary
generates false routes by tempering sensory data sending to the
robot to make the robot to see what the adversary desires. The
attack is shown to be successful in deviating the robot from
the optimal route. They also observe that once the adversarial
input is removed, the robot automatically reverts to taking the
correct route. Hence, an attacker can modify the behavior of
the model temporarily and leave behind zero or very little
evidence. It requires access to the trained policy but not the
hyperparameters used during training.
D. Attacks Targeting the Environment
Another way of performing an adversarial attack on DRL
is compromising the environment. Figure 14 depicts a basic
depiction of how an adversary can compromise the integrity of
the DRL process by adding perturbations to the environment.
Chen et al. [63] propose a common dominant adversarial
examples generation method (CDG) for crafting adversarial
examples with high confidence for the environment of DRL.
The proposed adversarial attack is tested on A3C trained for
pathfinding. It is reported that the proposed adversarial attack
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Fig. 14: Depiction of adversarial attacks on environment. Bold shows the part being
perturbed directly. Italic shows the parts that are indirectly affected by the attack.
Bold+Italic shows the outcome of the attack.
is successful at least 99.91% of the time. The core idea of their
attack is the addition of confusing obstacles to the original
clean map to confuse the robot by messing with its local
information. For a perturbation to be successful, it should
either stop the agent from reaching the destination or otherwise
delay the agent. Examples of adversarial images generated by
their proposed technique are shown in Figure 15.
Bai et al. [64] propose a method of finding adversarial
examples for DQNs trained for automatic pathfinding. This
attack works on first making a DQN learn how to solve
the problem of pathfinding and then analyzing it. Based on
the analysis, weaknesses presented in the Q-value curves
are identified. The attack involves the addition of adversarial
examples generated from these weaknesses to the environment.
This method is able to achieve a drop in performance by
generating successful perturbations in the environment hence
stopping the robot to achieve an optimal solution to the maze.
Xiao et al. [65] introduce online sequential attacks on the
environment of the DRL agent by exploiting the temporal
consistency of the states. Their attack performs faster than
the FGSM algorithm as no back-propagation is needed. This
attack is based on model querying and the authors provide two
methods for this, namely adaptive dimension sampling-based
finite difference method (SFD), and optimal frame selection
method. In addition to these sequential attacks, they also pro-
pose other attacks on the the observations, action selection, and
environment dynamics. The results of the proposed adversarial
attacks are reported on DQN and DDPG based games and
self-driving car simulator TORCS [66], and they show a clear
decline in rewards of the agent by both of attacks.
IV. DEFENSES AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON DRL
In this section, we will provide a detailed review of the
defenses proposed to deal with adversarial attacks on DRL.
Figure 16 shows a basic taxonomy of the defenses that can be
used for securing DRL algorithms. Table III summarizes key
information of the proposed defenses for DRL algorithms.
A. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training includes retraining of the ML model
using the adversarial examples along with the legitimate ex-
amples. This increases the robustness of the ML model against
adversarial examples as the model is now able to learn a better
distribution. Although adversarial retraining can help improve
the robustness of the ML model, the ML model can still be
compromised through adversarial examples generated through
some other methods. The goal of adversarial training is to
improve the generalization outside of the training manifold.
Kos et al. [54] present adversarial training as a method to
make DRL algorithms robust against these attacks. They re-
train their agent on perturbations generated using FGSM and
randon noise. They show that after retraining their A3C agent
(trained for playing Pong) becomes resilient to certain level
of random noise and FGSM perturbations.
Pattanaik et al. [48] also adpot adversarial training as a
measure to make the algorithms robust against the gradient-
based attacks. They show its equivalence to Robust Control.
They train the DRL model using the adversarial samples gener-
ated from the gradient-based attacks. This helps the algorithm
to model uncertainties in the system making them robust to
similar adversarial attacks. They show that the addition of
noise to the training samples while training the model also
increases the resilience of the DRL models against adversarial
attacks. Furthermore, they also demonstrate the benefits of
their technique by reporting its performance on DDQN and
DDPG algorithms. Han et al. [46] also propose adversarial
training as a method of robustifying the DRL algorithms
against adversarial attacks.
Behzadan et al. [67] investigate the robustness of the DRL
algorithms to both training and test time attacks. They show
that under the training time attack the DQN can learn and
become robust by changing the policy. They further show the
adversarially-trained policies to be more robust to test-time
attacks. They propose that for an agent to recover from these
adversarial attacks, the number of the adversarial samples in
the memory needs to reach a critical limit. In this way, when
the agent samples a random batch from the memory, it can
learn the perturbation statistics.
Later on, Behzadan et al. [68] compare the resilience to
adversarial attacks of two DQNs: one based on -greedy policy
learning and another employed NoisyNets [22] which is a
parameter-space noise exploration technique. They test their
proposed technique in three Atari games: Enduro, Assault,
and Blackout. Their results show the NoisyNets to be more
resilient to training-time attacks than that of the -greedy
policy. They argue that this resilience in NoisyNets is due
to the enhanced generalize-ability and reduced transferability.
Chen et al. [63] propose a gradient-based adversarial training
technique. They use adversarial perturbations generated using
their proposed attacking algorithm, i.e., CDG, for re-training
the RL agent. This approach can achieve a precision of
93.89% in detecting adversarial examples and hence prove
that adversarial training using their method can realize the
generalized attack immunity of A3C path finding with a high
confidence. The architecture proposed by [63] is depicted in
Figure 17. Behzadan et al. [69] propose adversarially guided
exploration (AGE) after considering the sample inefficiency
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Fig. 15: The example for dominant adversarial examples in A3C path finding [63] is presented in this figure. For each map, it is shown whether the robot can reach its desired
destination and the total time for path finding before and after adversarial perturbation. It is depicted that by adding “baffle-like” obstacles to the original map effectively disrupt
the robot path finding.
Paper DRL TechniqueTargeted
Inference-time Attacks Poisoning Attacks Target
White Box Black Box White Box Black Box Policy Observation Environment Reward
Behzadan et al. [13] DQN 3 3 - 3 - 3 - -
Huang et al. [51] DQN, TRPO & A3C 3 3 - 3 3 - - -
Kos et al. [54] A3C 3 - - - 3 - - -
Pattanaik et al. [48] DQN & DDPG 3 - - - - - - 3
Lin et al. [52] DQN & A3C 3 - - - 3 - - -
Tretschk et al. [55] DQN 3 - - - - - - 3
Clark et al. [43] DQN 3 - - - - 3 - -
Chen et al. [63] A3C - - 3 - - - 3 -
Han et al. [46] DDQN & A3C 3 3 3 - - - - 3
Behzadan et al. [59] DQN, A2C & PPO - 3 - - 3 - - 3
Kiourti et al. [57] A2C - - 3 3 3 - - 3
Yeow et al. [50] PPO and DDQN - - 3 - - - - 3
Hussenot et al. [60] DQN & Rainbow [23] 3 - 3 - - - 3 -
Xiao et al. [65] DQN & DDPG 3 3 - - - - 3 -
Huang et al. [47] Q-Learning - - 3 - - - - 3
Behzadan et al. [58] DQN - 3 - 3 - - -
Bai et al. [64] DQN - - 3 - - - 3 -
Gleave et al. [61] PPO - 3 - - 3 - - -
TABLE II: Summary of the adversarial attacks on DRL pipeline highlighting the threat model and attack location in the DRL pipeline.
of current adversarial training techniques. Their technique is
based on a modified hybrid of the -greedy algorithm and the
Boltzmann exploration. The new adversarial training proce-
dure is tested on DQN trained for the CartPole environment
with different perturbation probabilities. They show that for
small perturbations probabilities, i.e., 0.2 and 0.4, the agent
is able to recover from the attack while in the case of large
probabilities like 0.8 or 1 the agent is not able to recover. They
show that by using their technique for training, the agent is
able to improve upon these short-comings. They compare the
efficiency with -greedy and parameter-space noise exploration
algorithms and prove its feasibility.
B. Robust Learning
Robust learning is a training mechanism to ensure robust-
ness against training-time adversarial attacks. Behzadan et al.
[68] propose adding noise to the parameter state while training,
this technique is found very effective in mitigating the effects
of both training and test time attacks for both black-box
and white-box settings. The results of the proposed method
are tested on DQN trained for three Atari games, namely
Enduro, Assault, and Blackout. In particular, the authors use
FGSM for crafting adversarial samples. Then, they show the
performance of the normal agents to deteriorate to almost no
performance, while the ones which were retrained using the
parameter noise show great performance even in the presence
of adversarial inputs. Mandlekar et al. [70] show superior
resilience to adversarial attacks by introducing an adversarially
robust policy learning (ARPL) algorithm. This involves the use
of adversarial examples during training to enable robust policy
learning. The proposed mechanism is tested on TRPO based
four games, namely InvertedPendulum, HalfCheetah, Hopper,
and Walker and showed efficient performance under both
random and adversarial perturbations. They show that their
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Fig. 16: The Major Defense schemes used in DRL
Fig. 17: Architecture for the gradient band-based generalized attack immune model [63] is depicted in the figure.
proposed algorithm in the case of adversarial attack performed
almost the same as when trained. While in the case of agents
which do not follow their learning technique the performance
deteriorated drastically. It is important to note that the agent
trained using the ARPL algorithm does not perform as well
as the normal one in case of no perturbations.
Pinto et al. [71] propose Wasserstein robust reinforcement
learning (WR2L) as a method of robust policy learning in the
presence of an adversary. They formulate policy learning as a
zero-sum minimax objective function to ensure robustness to
differences in test and train conditions, even in the presence
of adversary. This shows the presence of generalization which
is necessary for algorithms that are to be trained in simula-
tions and tested in real environments. The proposed robust
learning mechanism is tested on TRPO-based five games,
namely InvertedPendulum, HalfCheetah, Hopper, Swimmer,
and Walker2D and shows significant robustness to adversarial
attacks. An adversary is introduced in the environment whose
goal is to destabilize the RL agent. Then they perform ex-
periments under different settings of the games and show the
agent which is trained using their technique can work better
than those of the normally trained agents. Abdullah et al. [72]
propose a robust reinforcement learning using a novel min-
max game with a Wasserstein constraint for a correct and
convergent solver. This technique shows a significant increase
in robustness in the case of both low and high-dimensional
control tasks. This technique is experimented on three algo-
rithms DDPG, TRPO, and PPO based gaming environments,
namely CartPole, Hopper, Halfcheetah, and Walker2D. They
also discuss that by using their technique the DDPG algorithms
are not able to achieve significant performance improvement
in robustness, even in the case of Inverted Pendulum. While
the other two DRL schemes, i.e., TRPO and PPO, demonstrate
acceptable performance and hence are reported in their results.
Smirnova et al. [73] propose a distributionally robust policy
iteration scheme to restrict the agent from learning sub-
optimal policy while exploring in cases of high-dimensional
state/action space. This induces a dynamic level of risk to
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stop the agent from taking sub-optimal actions. Their scheme
is based on robust Bellman operators, which provide a lower-
bound guarantee on the policy/state values. They also present
distributionally robust soft actor-critic based on mixed explo-
ration, acting conservatively in the short-term and exploring
optimistically in a long run leading to an optimal policy.
They show the usefulness of their proposed algorithm by
providing experiments on Hopper and Walker2D. If the learned
policy is robust to the changes in environment, then the policy
also performs better against adversarial attacks based on the
perturbations in the environment. Tessler et al. [74] propose
probabilistic MDP (PR-MDP) and noisy action robust MDP
(NR-MDP) as two new criteria for robustness. They modify
the DDPG to form AR-DDPG for solving these MDPs. The
proposed techniques are evaluated in various Mojuco environ-
ments and the results prove that the learning of action-robust
policies can help in making the proposed algorithms secure
and perform better even in the absence of these perturbations.
Kumar et al. [75] present a technique to make the DRL
algorithm learn in the presence of noisy rewards. The proposed
scheme is based on using a noise filter based on a non-linear
approximator to filter out the noise and estimate the reward.
They test their proposed technique using DDQNs and show
that the solution can filter a considerable amount of noise, up
to 50% perturbation.
C. Adversarial Detection
Adversarial detection involves the detection of adversarial
samples using a model specially trained to segregate the
true samples from the adversarial ones. In this way, we can
disregard the adversarial inputs without modifying the original
model. Lin et al. [76] propose a method of protecting the DRL
algorithms from adversarial attacks by leveraging an action-
conditioned frame prediction module. By using this technique,
they can detect the presence of adversarial attacks and make
the model robust by using the predicted frame instead of
the adversarial frame. They also compare their results with
other ML defense approaches to show the effectiveness of
this technique. To prove their technique, they provide their
results on 5 Atari games: Pong, Freeway, Sea-quest, Chopper-
Command, and Ms-Pacman. The techniques used for adver-
sarial example generation are FGSM, Carlini & Wagner [53],
and Basic Iterative Method [84]. The present results indicate
that their proposed technique is able to detect the adversarial
attacks with the accuracy from 60% to 100%.
Havens et al. [77] introduce a technique of making the
online algorithm robust to adversarial attacks. They detect
the presence of adversarial attacks via a supervisory agent by
learning separate sub-policies using the Meta-learned Advan-
tage Hierarchy (MLAH) framework. Because this technique
can handle the attacks in decision space, it can mitigate the
learned bias introduced by the adversary. They consider a
policy learning problem that is being attacked at specific
periods. The goal of the adversary is the corruption of state-
space while the agent trains. The supervisory agent aims to
mitigate the effect of the bias introduced by the adversary.
They assume that while training, the agent learns sub-policies
before learning the ultimate policy. Thus, the supervisory agent
is able to detect the presence of the adversarial examples due
to the being in unexpected states.
Xiang et al. [78] propose an advanced Q-learning algorithm
for automatic path-finding in robots, that is robust to adver-
sarial attacks by detecting the adversarial inputs. Specifically,
they propose a model to predict the adversarial inputs based on
a calculation determined by 5 factors: energy point gravitation,
key point gravitation, path gravitation, included angle, and the
placid point. The weights for these 5 factors are calculated
based on the principle component analysis (PCA). Using these
factors, they train a model able to achieve a precision of 70%
in segregating adversarial inputs from the normal ones.
Wang et al. [79] propose a reward confusion matrix to
generate rewards to help the RL agent to learn in cases
of perturbed/noisy inputs. Such rewards are called to be
Perturbed Rewards. Using these perturbed rewards, they are
able to develop an unbiased reward estimator aided robust
RL framework. Their algorithm not only achieves higher
expected rewards but also converges faster. They experiment
their technique extensively using several DRL algorithms
(Q-Learning, CEM, SARSA, DQN, Dueling DQN, DDPG,
NAF, and PPO) which are trained for different classic Atari
gaming environments (CartPole, Pendulum, AirRaid, Alien,
Carnival, MsPacman, Pong, Phoenix, Seaquest). They are able
to achieve a 67.5% and 46.7% improvements in average when
the error rate is 10% and 30%, respectively in the case of PPO.
They also discuss both the cases of the perturbations added to
some samples and perturbations being added to all samples.
Gallego et al. [80] introduce threatened Markov decision
processes (TMDPs), a variant of MDP. This framework sup-
ports the decision-making process in DRL setting against
adversaries that affect the reward generating process. They
propose a level-k thinking scheme resulting in a new frame-
work for dealing with TMDPs. They show that while a normal
Q-learning algorithm is exploited by an adversary, a level-
2 learner is able to approximately estimate the adversarial
behaviour and achieve a positive reward. Integrating DQNs
to TMDPs can also be a future research path.
D. Defensive Distillation
Papernot et al. [85] propose the idea of using defensive
distillation to deal with adversarial attacks on ML schemes.
Defensive distillation is a training method where a model is
trained to predict the output probabilities of another model
which is trained on the baseline standard to give more im-
portance to accuracy. Carlini et al. [86] show that defensive
distillation give false sense of robustness against adversarial
examples. Rusu et al. [87] present a method of extracting
the policy of a dense network to train another comparatively
less dense network. This new network can take expert-level
decisions while being smaller in size. This method can also
be used to merge multiple task-specific policies into a single
policy. They use their technique on multiple Atari games and
prove their claims by showing a superior performance in the
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TABLE III: Summary of defenses against adversarial attacks on DRL
Articles Proposed Techniques Effective Against
Kos et al. [54] Adversarial Training using Random Noise & FGSM Random Noise & FGSM Attacks
Pattanaik et al. [48] Adversarial Training using Noise & Gradient-Based Attacks Noise & Gradient Based Attacks
Han et al. [46] Adversarial Training using corrupted nodes in SDN Node Corruption Falsifying Attacks
Behzadan et al. [67] Adversarial Training using Perturbed States Attacks Perturbing aConsiderable no. of States
Chen et al. [63] Gradient Band-Based Adversarial Training Gradient Band Based Adversarial Attacks
Behzadan et al. [68] Noisy Exploration State Perturbation Attacks
Mandlekar et al. [70] Adversarially Robust Policy Learning (ARPL) State Perturbation Attacks
Pinto et al. [71] Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) Attacks Targeting the Performance
Lin et al. [76] Action-conditioned Frame Prediction Module Attacks Perturbing the States
Havens et al. [77] Meta-learned Advantage Hierarchy (MLAH) Training-Time Poisoning Attacks
Xiang et al. [78] PCA for Adversarial Detection Attacks Perturbing the States
Wang et al. [79] Reward Confusion Matrix Attacks Perturbing the Rewards
Gallego et al. [80] Threatened Markov Decision Processes (TMDPs) Attacks Affecting Reward Generation
Bravo et al. [81] Game-Theoretic Approach Noise Based Attacks
Ogunmolu et al. [82] Game-Theoretic Approach Attacks Targeting the Policy
Behzadan et al. [83] Benchmarking Generic Adversarial Attacks
Behzadan et al. [58] Water Marking Model Extraction Attacks
Behzadan et al. [69] Adversarially Guided Exploration (AGE) Limited Attack Samples
Abdullah et al. [72] Wasserstein Robust Reinforcement Learning (WR2L) Generic Adversarial Attacks
Smirnova et al. [73] Distributionally Robust Policy Iteration Attacks Targeting the Policy
Tessler et al. [74] PR-MDPs & NR-MDPs Generic Adversarial Attacks
Kumar et al. [75] Noise Filter Attacks Perturbing the Rewards
less dense networks. They show that the distilled agents which
were 4 times smaller than DQNs were able to achieve better
performance than DQN. They also show that the agents having
25 times less parameters than DQN were able to achieve a
performance of 84% as compared to the 100% of the DQN.
Such networks are proved to be more stable and robust to
adversarial noise and attacks, as they have less parameters
than their denser counterparts and hence decreasing the places
the adversary can target in order to achieve the adversarial
goal.
Recently, Czarnecki et al. [88] have reported a study uti-
lizing distillation in which the authors analyzed empirically
and theoretically each variant of distillation and reported their
strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, they also propose
expected entropy regularized distillation which makes the
training much faster while guaranteeing convergence. This
technique can be used in making the DRL models robust to
adversarial attacks by leveraging learning information from a
complex model into a simpler one. Hence, making the models
robust to adversarial attacks. However, as discussed by Carlini
et al. [86], using this technique alone may not be effective. It
needs to be combined with other approaches, like adversarial
training, adversarial detection etc., in order to be successful.
E. Game theoretic approach
Bravo et al. [81] examine a game approach where the
players adjust their actions based on past payoff observations
that are subject to adversarial perturbations. In the single-
player case containing an agent trying to adapt to an arbitrarily
changing environment, they show that irrespective of the level
of noise in the player’s observations, the stochastic dynamics
under study lead to no regret almost surely. In the case of mul-
tiple players, they show that the dominated strategies become
extinct and the strict Nash equilibrium are stochastically stable
and attractive. Conversely, a stable or attractive state with pos-
itive probability is the Nash equilibrium. Finally, they provide
with an averaging principle and show that in the case of 2-
player zero-sum games with an interior equilibrium, the time
averages converge to Nash equilibrium for any noise level.
Ogunmolu et al. [82] proposed an iterative minimax dynamic
game framework that helps in designing robust policies in the
presence of adversarial inputs. They also propose a method of
quantifying the robustness capacity of a policy. They evaluate
their proposed framework on a mecanum-wheeled robot. The
goal of this agent is to find a locally robust optimal multistage
policy that achieves a given goal-reaching task.
V. METRICS, TOOLS, AND PLATFORMS FOR
BENCHMARKING DRL
As we have previously discussed, DRL is different from
other ML schemes, and only reporting the accuracy is not
sufficient to cover security aspects of the DRL schemes. In
particular, we need to keep in mind the temporal domain
aspect of the DRL while designing the DRL-based attack or
defense. Benchmarking the DRL performance in attacks and
defenses is very important. The need for an applicable solution
to evaluate the robustness and resilience of DRL policies is not
fulfilled by the current literature. There is also a need for a
quantitative approach to measure and benchmark the resilience
and robustness of DRL policies in a reusable and generalizable
manner.
There are few benchmarks proposed, but they are not
sufficient to cover the security aspects needed to measure
the robustness and resilience of DRL algorithms. The few
proposed approaches are discussed in this section. Behzadan
et al. [89] introduce the terms of adversarial budget and
adversarial regret as a measure to quantify the robustness and
resilience of DRL algorithms. Adversarial budget is defined
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as the maximum number of features that can be perturbed
in the observation, and the probability of perturbing each
observation. The adversarial regret is the difference between
the reward obtained by the unperturbed agent and the reward
obtained by the perturbed agent after an episode. On the
basis of these two terms, Behzadan et al. [89] define test-time
resilience and test-time robustness.
A. Test-time Resilience and Robustness
Test-time resilience is described as the minimum number
of perturbations required to incur the maximum reduction to
reward at time t, while Test-time robustness is described as
the maximum achievable adversarial regret.
The following procedure was proposed to measure test-time
resilience for DRL algorithms:
• Approximate the state-action value function using policy
imitation in case it is not already given.
• Report the optimal adversarial return and maximum ad-
versarial regret by training the adversarial agent against
the target’s policy.
• Apply the obtained adversarial policy to the target for
several episodes while recording the reward for each.
• Report the average adversarial reward over these episodes
as the mean test-time resilience of the target policy.
The method of measuring the test-time robustness is the
same as test-time resilience. The only difference is that in the
test-time case we measure the average adversarial regret in
place of the average adversarial reward.
Behzadan et al. [83] propose a novel framework for bench-
marking the behavior of DRL-based collision avoidance mech-
anisms under the worst-case scenario of dealing with an ad-
versarial agent which is trained to drive the system into unsafe
states. They prove the practical applicability of the technique
by comparing the reliability of two collision avoidance systems
against intentional collision attempts. More recently, Behzadan
et al. [58] have presented a technique for watermarking DRL
policies for robustness against model extraction attacks. This
involves the integration of a unique response to a specific
sequence of states while keeping its impact on performance
minimum hence saving from the unauthorized replication of
policies. Then, they prove their technique by experimenting
on a DQN trained in a CartPole environment. It is shown that
unwatermarked policies are not able to follow the identified
trajectory. Table III provides a summary of the available
defenses against adversarial attacks on DRL.
B. Metrics for Attack Performance
Kiourti et al. [57], introduce three metrics for measuring the
performance of the DRL attacks, namely (1) performance Gap,
(2) percentage of target action and (3) time to failure. As the
name suggests, the performance gap is the difference between
the performance of the normal and the victim model. For the
second metric (percentage of target action), they measure the
number of times the adversarial/targeted action is performed
by the victim policy. The third metric (time to failure) is
the number of consecutive states that need to be perturbed
to trigger a complete failure of the model.
As observed, these proposed measurement techniques can
only cover a part of the DRL algorithms, and hence are
not sufficient for measuring the performance of the DRL
algorithms under the wide range of adversarial attacks and
defenses. There is therefore a need for the development of
benchmarks that can be used as standards for DRL algorithms
as a measure of their resilience and robustness to adversarial
attacks.
C. Attacking DRL: Tools and Platforms
DRL can be implemented using several toolkits available.
OpenAIGym [90] and Tensorflow [91] which provide integrat-
ing mechanisms in order to implement DRL models. RLCoach
[92] and Horizon [93] are similar toolkit available for testing
DRL algorithms on different games. NS3GYM [94] provides
us with network environments. Combining these toolkits for
implementing RL (discussed in the previous section) with
the toolkits available for attacking DL [95] and DRL [67],
we can test different attacks on our algorithms in simulated
environments.
VI. OPEN ISSUES AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Despite a lot of defenses are proposed, the security of DRL
algorithms remains an open challenge. The proposed defenses
are only able to defend from attacks they are designed for.
Hence, they are still vulnerable to attacks led by a proactive
adversary. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [96] point out that no matter
how many adversarial examples are added to the training data,
there are new adversarial examples that can be generated to
cheat those newly trained networks. Moreover, if the adversary
is only targeting confidence levels then we may never be
able to detect the attack until the adversary uses his created
deficiency for his benefit. We may not be even able to trace
the attacks as shown by Clark et al. [43]. Thus, methods to
make the DRL algorithms more robust are urgent need.
A. Multitask Learning
One of the major challenges for RL is learning to do
multiple tasks at a single time. It requires a lot of samples for
this. Currently, proposed RL algorithms can only learn to per-
form one task perfectly. They can be trained to play multiple
games (like Cartpole, Inverted Pendulum etc.), but they need
to be trained from scratch for each game. The algorithms are
expected to be scalable and be more generalizable, so that their
learning can be transferred from one game to another. Multi-
task learning can help us in making robust models that can
grip the true essence of the tasks and hence become difficult
to be fooled.
B. Metrics for Robustness and Resilience
We need to study why vulnerabilities exist in the DRL
models and how can we mitigate them and train robust models.
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A major reason for the existence of these vulnerabilities is
the use of DRL models without the proper knowledge of the
domain. There is a need to properly define the benchmarks of
DRL in terms of robustness of DRL against adversarial attacks.
Behzadan et al. [89] recently have proposed techniques of
quantifying the robustness and resilience of the RL algorithms.
Some benchmarks are also proposed by Kiourti et al. [57] but
as previously discussed these benchmarks are inadequate to
measure the robustness and resilience of an algorithm even
though they can be used as stepping stones to lead us to a
final goal.
C. System Design and Transferability
System design remains an open challenge for the case of
DRL. There is a need to define standards for system design
for DRL problems as in this case the learning process is not
supervised. So, the agent may not focus on the features that it
needs to learn. This can introduce the error by mistake of the
intermediary and also even induce his behavior on the model.
We need to have proper standards for designing the reward
functions. The system design needs to be robust and resilient
to adversarial attacks.
D. Ensemble of Defenses
A lot of ensemble defenses have been proposed for the case
of DL. However, they may not be appropriate to apply in the
case of DRL as it can lead to an exponential increase in the
complexity of the model which results in significant decrease
in performance. In the case of DRL, the model is making
real-time prediction, so a small reduction in the computation
capabilities may cause a great loss to the agent. This remains
a challenge to defend our model using an ensemble with a
minimum loss of computations.
Model-extraction attacks pose a serious threat to the in-
tegrity of the learned models e.g. illegal duplication. The only
mitigation, as suggested by Behzadan et al. [59], is to increase
the cost of such attacks or to watermark the policies. We may
experience some randomness in the agent to save from such
attacks but that will incur an unacceptable loss of decreased
performance. Developing techniques that can incur constrained
randomization in the model to save from such attacks is a
promising field of research.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The broadening applicability of DRL in the real world has
diverged our concern to the security of these algorithms against
adversarial attacks. This paper has provided a comprehensive
survey of the latest techniques proposed for attacking the
DRL algorithms and the defenses proposed for defending the
DRL algorithms against these attacks. We have also discussed
the open research issues and provided the list of available
benchmarks for measuring the resilience and robustness of
DRL algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
paper which presents a comprehensive survey of the state-of-
the-art literature on adversarial attacks on DRL.
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